## Game Theory 8 – chap14. Bayesian Nash equilibrium example

Learn an example of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Learn an example of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

We will discuss finite/infinite games that work on the same principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium and utilize BR to derive BNE.

We will learn how to model incomplete information and the basic idea. We will also see how to turn an incomplete problem into an imperfect problem.

Consider an example of two players deciding whether to start a business together. Draw the normal form of the equilibrium as a function of cost and find the situations in which investment occurs.

Find the deviation of the cooperation phase and the punishment phase so that equilibrium can be reached. Also, learn the status of the one-shot deviation principle.

Learn about an example of finding a pure-strategy SPE to find the best response of repeated interactions. We will also explore the prisoners’ dilemma for unique NEs.

Learn how far rationality can take you, and how to find Nash equilibria in a variety of examples, including the Cournot Duopoly.

Learn about Nash equilibrium, a third way to make predictions in normal-form games. We will also see how to find a Nash equilibrium in a Location game.

Learn about rationalizability, a second way to predict in normal-form games. Examine the difference between 2-player and 3-player games in terms of ISD and BR.

Learn about strict/weak dominant/dominated strategies and see an example of an ISD, which stands for iterated strict dominance.