NETS 4120: Algorithmic Game Theory #1
Algorithmic Game Theory
Game Theory
Game Theory 11 – chap22. Job-market signaling
Learn about the first application of signaling, job-market signaling by Michael Spence.
Game Theory 11 – chap21. Forward induction and Cho-Kreps’ intuitive criterion
Learn how to refine the various PBEs in a signaling game using forward induction.
Game Theory 10 – chap20. Computing PBE in signaling games
Describe how to find a PBE in a signaling game.
Game Theory 10 – chap19. Signaling games intro
Introduce signaling games and explain how PBEs are defined in these games.
Game Theory 10 – chap18. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), explain its existence, how it relates to existing equilibria (NE/SPE), and finally how this relationship can be used to find a PBE.
Game Theory 10 – chap17. Sequential rationality in games of imperfect information
We explain how to define sequential rationality in dynamic Bayesian games and why traditional equilibria (SPE or NE) do not satisfy sequential rationality.
Game Theory : Semi-Separating / Partially-Pooling Equilibrium
This lecture introduces semi-separating equilibrium as a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games. A less popular but still equivalent name for it is partially-pooling equilibrium.
Game Theory 9 – chap16. IPV Auctions
Learn about independent private value auctions, the third application of a Bayesian game.
Game Theory 9 – chap15. The lemon market
Learn about Akerlof’s lemon market, the first application of a Bayesian game. Learn when to trade lemons in equilibrium.