## NETS 4120: Algorithmic Game Theory #1

Algorithmic Game Theory

Algorithmic Game Theory

Learn about the first application of signaling, job-market signaling by Michael Spence.

Learn how to refine the various PBEs in a signaling game using forward induction.

Describe how to find a PBE in a signaling game.

Introduce signaling games and explain how PBEs are defined in these games.

Define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), explain its existence, how it relates to existing equilibria (NE/SPE), and finally how this relationship can be used to find a PBE.

We explain how to define sequential rationality in dynamic Bayesian games and why traditional equilibria (SPE or NE) do not satisfy sequential rationality.

This lecture introduces semi-separating equilibrium as a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games. A less popular but still equivalent name for it is partially-pooling equilibrium.

Learn about independent private value auctions, the third application of a Bayesian game.

Learn about Akerlof’s lemon market, the first application of a Bayesian game. Learn when to trade lemons in equilibrium.