| Sarah's Tech & Research Blog
sehee This study presents the basic concepts of MTD and game theory, followed by a literature review, to study MTD decision-making methods based on game theory from the dimensions of space, time, space–time, and bounded rationality.
VCG is neither individually rational nor budget balanced in general, but could there exist some other incentive-compatible mechanism that is? This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) gives an example that proves the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem, which states that there is no such mechanism.
In general, VCG is neither budget balanced nor individually rational. This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) introduces some additional assumptions under which it is possible to get individual rationality and budget balance in VCG. It features Kevin Leyton-Brown (UBC).
If VCG is so wonderful, why don’t we use it for everything? This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) describes some of the VCG’s serious drawbacks. It features Kevin Leyton-Brown (UBC).
This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) gives an example of VCG in action. It features Yoav Shoham (Stanford).
This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) formally defines the VCG mechanism, and proves some of its desirable properties. It features Matt Jackson (Stanford).
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, or VCG, is one of mechanism design’s success stories. This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) gives a high-level introduction to the VCG mechanism, what it does, why it is important, and the kinds of settings to which it applies. It features Kevin Leyton-Brown (UBC).
I want to identify the client IP for SSL/TLS negotiation errors when connecting to an Application Load Balancer (ALB) using HTTPS.
Our work is aimed at better understanding the behavior of agents in settings where their privacy concerns are explicitly given. We consider a toy setting where agent A, in an attempt to discover the secret type of agent B, offers B a gift that one type of B agent likes and the other type dislikes.
In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in players’ utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has a small privacy cost to player i.