Game Theory 7 – chap10. Infinitely repeated games
Find the deviation of the cooperation phase and the punishment phase so that equilibrium can be reached. Also, learn the status of the one-shot deviation principle.
Find the deviation of the cooperation phase and the punishment phase so that equilibrium can be reached. Also, learn the status of the one-shot deviation principle.
Learn about an example of finding a pure-strategy SPE to find the best response of repeated interactions. We will also explore the prisoners’ dilemma for unique NEs.
Learn how far rationality can take you, and how to find Nash equilibria in a variety of examples, including the Cournot Duopoly.
Learn about Nash equilibrium, a third way to make predictions in normal-form games. We will also see how to find a Nash equilibrium in a Location game.
Learn about rationalizability, a second way to predict in normal-form games. Examine the difference between 2-player and 3-player games in terms of ISD and BR.
Learn about strict/weak dominant/dominated strategies and see an example of an ISD, which stands for iterated strict dominance.
Of the three elements of a normal form game, we’ll look at strategy, and how to choose a strategy that maximizes the expected payoff under a given belief.
Analyze the four elements of a normal form game, consider the payoff function, and work through an example. We will also learn about mixed strategies, which represent probability distributions over the strategy space.
Learn about interactive knowledge among the classifications of game theory, and the difference between common knowledge and public knowledge.
Learn what game theory is and how to use it to make decisions based on complete/incomplete information and simultaneous/sequential players.