Game Theory 8 – chap12. Random events and incomplete information
We will learn how to model incomplete information and the basic idea. We will also see how to turn an incomplete problem into an imperfect problem.
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Game Theory 7 – chap11. Hold-up problem exercies
Consider an example of two players deciding whether to start a business together. Draw the normal form of the equilibrium as a function of cost and find the situations in which investment occurs.
Game Theory 7 – chap10. Infinitely repeated games
Find the deviation of the cooperation phase and the punishment phase so that equilibrium can be reached. Also, learn the status of the one-shot deviation principle.
Game Theory 7 – chap09. Finitely repeated game
Learn about an example of finding a pure-strategy SPE to find the best response of repeated interactions. We will also explore the prisoners’ dilemma for unique NEs.
Game Theory 3 – chap08. Application I
Learn how far rationality can take you, and how to find Nash equilibria in a variety of examples, including the Cournot Duopoly.
Game Theory 2 – chap07. Nash Equilibrium & Location Game
Learn about Nash equilibrium, a third way to make predictions in normal-form games. We will also see how to find a Nash equilibrium in a Location game.
Game Theory 2 – chap06. Rationalizability
Learn about rationalizability, a second way to predict in normal-form games. Examine the difference between 2-player and 3-player games in terms of ISD and BR.
TED Translation | from EN to ES – Who am I (Quién soy)
Translated the “Who am I” video from English to Spanish as a TED Translation Volunteer.
Game Theory 2 – chap05. Strict/weak dominance
Learn about strict/weak dominant/dominated strategies and see an example of an ISD, which stands for iterated strict dominance.
Game Theory 2 – chap04. Normal-form games, basic concepts
Of the three elements of a normal form game, we’ll look at strategy, and how to choose a strategy that maximizes the expected payoff under a given belief.