Game Theory 11 – chap21. Forward induction and Cho-Kreps’ intuitive criterion
Learn how to refine the various PBEs in a signaling game using forward induction.
Learn how to refine the various PBEs in a signaling game using forward induction.
Describe how to find a PBE in a signaling game.
Introduce signaling games and explain how PBEs are defined in these games.
Define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), explain its existence, how it relates to existing equilibria (NE/SPE), and finally how this relationship can be used to find a PBE.
We explain how to define sequential rationality in dynamic Bayesian games and why traditional equilibria (SPE or NE) do not satisfy sequential rationality.
This lecture introduces semi-separating equilibrium as a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games. A less popular but still equivalent name for it is partially-pooling equilibrium.
Learn about independent private value auctions, the third application of a Bayesian game.
Learn about Akerlof’s lemon market, the first application of a Bayesian game. Learn when to trade lemons in equilibrium.
Learn an example of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
We will discuss finite/infinite games that work on the same principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium and utilize BR to derive BNE.