Game Theory 10 – chap19. Signaling games intro
Introduce signaling games and explain how PBEs are defined in these games.
Game Theory
Game Theory 10 – chap18. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), explain its existence, how it relates to existing equilibria (NE/SPE), and finally how this relationship can be used to find a PBE.
Game Theory 10 – chap17. Sequential rationality in games of imperfect information
We explain how to define sequential rationality in dynamic Bayesian games and why traditional equilibria (SPE or NE) do not satisfy sequential rationality.
Game Theory : Semi-Separating / Partially-Pooling Equilibrium
This lecture introduces semi-separating equilibrium as a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games. A less popular but still equivalent name for it is partially-pooling equilibrium.
Game Theory 9 – chap16. IPV Auctions
Learn about independent private value auctions, the third application of a Bayesian game.
Game Theory 9 – chap15. The lemon market
Learn about Akerlof’s lemon market, the first application of a Bayesian game. Learn when to trade lemons in equilibrium.
Game Theory 8 – chap14. Bayesian Nash equilibrium example
Learn an example of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Game Theory 8 – chap13. Bayesian Nash equilibrium
We will discuss finite/infinite games that work on the same principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium and utilize BR to derive BNE.
Game Theory 8 – chap12. Random events and incomplete information
We will learn how to model incomplete information and the basic idea. We will also see how to turn an incomplete problem into an imperfect problem.
Game Theory 7 – chap11. Hold-up problem exercies
Consider an example of two players deciding whether to start a business together. Draw the normal form of the equilibrium as a function of cost and find the situations in which investment occurs.