| Sarah's Tech & Research Blog
This lecture introduces semi-separating equilibrium as a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games. A less popular but still equivalent name for it is partially-pooling equilibrium.
Learn about independent private value auctions, the third application of a Bayesian game.
Learn about Akerlof’s lemon market, the first application of a Bayesian game. Learn when to trade lemons in equilibrium.
Learn an example of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
We will discuss finite/infinite games that work on the same principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium and utilize BR to derive BNE.
We will learn how to model incomplete information and the basic idea. We will also see how to turn an incomplete problem into an imperfect problem.
Consider an example of two players deciding whether to start a business together. Draw the normal form of the equilibrium as a function of cost and find the situations in which investment occurs.
Find the deviation of the cooperation phase and the punishment phase so that equilibrium can be reached. Also, learn the status of the one-shot deviation principle.
Learn about an example of finding a pure-strategy SPE to find the best response of repeated interactions. We will also explore the prisoners’ dilemma for unique NEs.
Learn how far rationality can take you, and how to find Nash equilibria in a variety of examples, including the Cournot Duopoly.