[review#27] Survey of Cyber Moving Targets Second Edition_2018
This report is the result of studies performed at Lincoln Laboratory, a federally funded research and development center operated by Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
This report is the result of studies performed at Lincoln Laboratory, a federally funded research and development center operated by Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
In this article, we first provide a thorough analysis of the threats in the cloud–edge–terminal network. Then, we conduct a comprehensive survey to discuss the concept, design principles, and main classifications of MTD. Next, we further introduce the development potential in terms of AI-powered MTD on each network layer.
I want to associate my Amazon Route 53 profiles with an Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) that belongs to a different AWS account.
In this paper, we propose a concept of deception attack surface to illustrate deception-based moving target defense. Moreover, we propose a quantitative method to measure deception, which includes two core concepts: exposed falseness degree and hidden truth de
gree.
This paper presents a proactive network reconnaissance defense mechanism based on the temporal randomization of network IP addresses, MAC addresses and port numbers.
The chapters in this book present a range of MTD challenges and promising solution paths based on game–theoretic approaches, network-based cyber maneuver, and software transformations.
By designing a trilateral game cost-effective shuffling algorithm, we capture the best MTD strategy and reach a balance between them in a given shuffling scenario.
This study presents the basic concepts of MTD and game theory, followed by a literature review, to study MTD decision-making methods based on game theory from the dimensions of space, time, space–time, and bounded rationality.
VCG is neither individually rational nor budget balanced in general, but could there exist some other incentive-compatible mechanism that is? This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) gives an example that proves the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem, which states that there is no such mechanism.
In general, VCG is neither budget balanced nor individually rational. This post from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) introduces some additional assumptions under which it is possible to get individual rationality and budget balance in VCG. It features Kevin Leyton-Brown (UBC).