{"id":2778,"date":"2023-10-05T01:33:55","date_gmt":"2023-10-04T16:33:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/?p=2778"},"modified":"2023-10-05T19:27:18","modified_gmt":"2023-10-05T10:27:18","slug":"review-8-decision-and-game-theory-for-security-12th-international-conference-gamesec-2021","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/2023\/10\/review-8-decision-and-game-theory-for-security-12th-international-conference-gamesec-2021\/","title":{"rendered":"[review #8] Decision and Game Theory for Security | 12th International Conference, GameSec 2021"},"content":{"rendered":"

Concents<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Decision and Game Theory for Security: 12th International Conference, GameSec 2021 Virtual Event, October 25-27, 2021 Proceedings\n\n1) Theoretical Foundations in Equilibrium Computation\n2) Machine Learning and Game Theory\n3) Ransomware\n4) Cyber-physical Systems Security\n5) Innovations in Attacks and Defenses<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
Theoretical Foundations in Equilibrium Computation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Computing Nash Equilibria in Multiplayer DAG-Structured Stohastic<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Stochastic game \u00b7 Imperfect information \u00b7 Nash equilibrium<\/p>\n\n\n\n
model: 4-player imperfect-information stochastic game, 3-player poker tournament<\/p>\n\n\n\n
induced POMDP<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Two Algorithms for Computing Exact and Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
bimatrix game\uc774 \uc804\ub7b5\uc801\uc73c\ub85c \ub3d9\ub4f1\ud55c \uc81c\ub85c\uc12c \uac8c\uc784\uc744 \uac00\uc9c0\uace0 \uc788\ub294\uc9c0 \uc5ec\ubd80\ub97c \uacb0\uc815<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 1950, John Nash defined Nash equilibrium (NE) as a solution concept in non-cooperative games, in which each player\u2019s expected payoff is maximized with the knowledge of other players\u2019 strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Brouwer\u2019s Fixed Point Theorem\ub97c \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud558\uc5ec \ubaa8\ub4e0 finite-action finite-player non-cooperative game \ud3c9\ud615\uc774 \uc874\uc7ac\ud55c\ub2e4\ub294 \uac83\uc744 \uc99d\uba85\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u03b5-NE solution
Definition 1 (Best response condition) ~ Definition 6 (\u03b5-well-supported Nash Equilibrium)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
non-zero-sum game\uc744 \uac10\uc548\ud560 \ub54c \uc804\ub7b5\uc801\uc73c\ub85c \ub3d9\ub4f1\ud55c zero-sum game\uc744 \uacb0\uc815\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c \ub450 \uac00\uc9c0 \uc54c\uace0\ub9ac\uc998 \uc81c\uc548
\ubcc0\ud658\ub41c \ud568\uc218\uc758 \uace0\uc815\uc810\uc744 \uacc4\uc0b0\ud574\uc11c bimatrix game\uc758 NE\ub97c \uacc4\uc0b0\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\ub294 best response bijection\uc758 \uc0c8\ub85c\uc6b4 \uacb0\uacfc \uc81c\uc2dc<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Separable Network Games with Compact Strategy Sets<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Abstract<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Separable network game \u00b7 Continuous game \u00b7 Polynomial game<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Hamiltonian dynamics, bipartite graph of a security game, zero-sum continuous network game<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Machine Learning and Game Theory<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Countering Attacker Data Manipulation in Security Games<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
ink.library.smu.edu.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
1) \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uc758 \uc2e4\uc81c \ud589\ub3d9 \ucd94\uc815 \uae30\uc220 \uac1c\ubc1c
2) \ubc29\uc5b4\uc790\uac00 \ucd5c\uc18c\ud55c\uc758 \uae30\ub85d \ub370\uc774\ud130\uc5d0 \uc561\uc138\uc2a4\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\ub294 \uacbd\uc6b0\uc5d0\ub3c4 \uc2e4\ud589 \uac00\ub2a5\ud558\ub3c4\ub85d \ud655\uc7a5
3) \ucd94\uc815 \ubd88\ud655\uc2e4\uc131 \ub0b4\uc5d0\uc11c \ucd5c\uc545\uc758 \uacbd\uc6b0\uc5d0 \ub300\ube44\ud558\uc5ec \ubc29\uc5b4\uc790\uc758 \uc804\ub7b5\uc744 \ucd5c\uc801\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c \ucd5c\ub300\ud654 \uc811\uadfc \ubc29\uc2dd\uc744 \ud65c\uc6a9
4) \ubc18\uae30\ub9cc \ubc29\ubc95(counter-deception methods)\uc758 \ud6a8\uc728\uc131 \uc785\uc99d – \uad11\ubc94\uc704\ud55c \uc2e4\ud5d8\uc744 \uc218\ud589\ud574\uc11c \ubc29\uc5b4\uc790\uc5d0\uac8c\ub294 \ud655\uc2e4\ud55c \uc774\ub4dd, \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uc5d0\uac8c\ub294 \uc190\uc2e4\uc744 \ubcf4\uc5ec\uc90c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc784\uc758\uc758 \uc791\uc740 \u03b5 > 0\uc5d0 \ub300\ud574, \ub2e4\ud56d\uc2dd \uc2dc\uac04\uc758 \uc624\ub958 \ub0b4 \u03b5-error\uc744 \ucc3e\ub294 \uacfc\uc815
RaBiS(Range-finding Binary Search)\ub97c \ud1b5\ud574 \ubc29\uc5b4\uc790\ub294 \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc73c\ub85c \ubcc0\uacbd\ub41c \uacfc\uac70 \uacf5\uaca9 \ub370\uc774\ud130\ub97c \uaff0\ub6ab\uc218 \uc788\uc74c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Scalable Optimal Classifiers for Adversarial Settings Under Uncertainty<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc120\ud5d8\uc801 \uc81c\uc548 \uc5c6\uc774 \ubd84\ub958\uc790\ub97c \uc120\ud0dd\ud558\ub294 Bayesian Nash equilibria \uc81c\uc548<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Learning Generative Deception Strategies in Combinatorial Masking Games<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Deception Games \u00b7 Masking Strategies \u00b7 Generative Adversarial Networks<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1) \ubb38\uc81c\ub97c \ud480\uae30 \uc704\ud55c constraint generation approach
2) \ub450 \ud50c\ub808\uc774\uc5b4\uc758 \uc804\ub7b5\uc744 \uc2e0\uacbd\ub9dd\uc73c\ub85c \ud45c\ud604\ud558\uc5ec \uc0c8\ub85c\uc6b4 \uc811\uadfc \ubc29\uc2dd \uac1c\ubc1c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc801\uc5d0\uac8c \uc720\ucd9c\ub418\ub294 \uc870\ud569 \uc2e0\ud638 \uac8c\uc784
\ub450 \ud50c\ub808\uc774\uc5b4\uc758 \uc804\ub7b5\uc744 \uc2e0\uacbd\ub9dd\uc73c\ub85c \uc778\ucf54\ub529 (\uc77c\ubd80 OS \ucde8\uc57d\uc810\uc744 \ub9c8\uc2a4\ud0b9-\ube68\uac04\uc0c9, \ub9c8\uc2a4\ud0b9\ub418\uc9c0 \uc54a\uc740 \uc18d\uc131-\ud30c\ub780\uc0c9)
\uac8c\uc784\uc758 \ub300\ub7b5 \ud3c9\ud615 \uc194\ub8e8\uc158\uc744 \ud559\uc2b5\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c gradient-based approach \uc81c\uc548<\/p>\n\n\n\n
GAM(generative adversarial masking), Greedy \uae30\ubc95 \uc801\uc6a9<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Network Games with Strategic Machine Learning<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Abstract<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Stackelberg game \u00b7 Strategic machine learning \u00b7 Mechanism design<\/p>\n\n\n\n
decision maker: planner – agents<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
No Time to Lie: Bounds on the Learning Rate of a Defender for Inferring Attack Target Preferences<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Absract | dl.acm.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ubc29\uc5b4\uc790\uac00 \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uac00 \uc120\ud638\ub3c4\ub97c \ud559\uc2b5\ud558\ub294 \ub370 \ud544\uc694\ud55c \uad00\ucc30 \ud69f\uc218\uc758 \uc0c1\ud55c\uacfc \ud558\ud55c\uc774 \ud45c\uc2dc\ub418\ub294 \uc774\ub860\uc801 \ubaa8\ub378 \uc81c\uc2dc<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When Should You Defend Your Classifier? – A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Countermeasures Against Adversarial Examples<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Adversarial classification \u00b7 Game theory \u00b7 Correct classification rate<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We started this paper with the question: when should you defend your classifier?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc801\ub300\uc801 \uae30\uacc4 \ud559\uc2b5\uc5d0\uc11c \uc801\uacfc \ubc29\uc5b4\uc790 \uac04\uc758 \uc0c1\ud638\uc791\uc6a9\uc758 \ubaa8\ub4e0 \uad00\ub828 \uce21\uba74\uc744 \ud3ec\ucc29\ud558\ub294 advanced adversarial classification game \uc81c\uc2dc<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ransomware<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A Mechanism Design Approach to Solve Ransomware Dilemmas<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Abstract<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Ransomware \u00b7 Mechanism design \u00b7 Smart-contract<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uacf5\uaca9\uc790: \ub370\uc774\ud130\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ud53c\ud574\uc790\uc758 \uc2e4\uc81c \uac00\uce58\ub97c \ubaa8\ub984
\ud53c\ud574\uc790: \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\ub97c \ub9cc\uc871\uc2dc\ud0ac \uc218 \uc788\ub294 \ucd5c\uc18c \ubab8\uac12\uc744 \ubaa8\ub984
– \ubab8\uac12\uc744 \ud611\uc0c1\ud558\ub294 \ub370 \uc2dc\uac04\uc774 \ub9ce\uc774 \uac78\ub9bc<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ub370\uc774\ud130 \uc720\ucd9c\uc744 \uac00\uc18d\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574\uc11c\ub294 \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uc640 \ud53c\ud574\uc790 \uac04\uc758 \ud611\uc0c1\uc744 \ucd09\uc9c4\ud558\ub294 \uac83\uc774 \uc911\uc694\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
TTP(Trusted Third Party) \uc5c6\uc774 \ubab8\uac12 \ud611\uc0c1\uc744 \uc9c0\uc6d0\ud558\ub294 \uba54\ucee4\ub2c8\uc998\uc758 \uac1c\ubc1c\uc744 \uc870\uc0ac<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1) \uacf5\uc815\ud55c \ubab8\uac12\uc744 \uc5f0\uad6c\ud558\uace0 \uc778\uc13c\ud2f0\ube0c \ud638\ud658\uc131\uc744 \ub2ec\uc131\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 \uc591\uba74 \ube14\ub77c\uc778\ub4dc \uacbd\ub9e4 \uba54\ucee4\ub2c8\uc998\uc758 \uac1c\ubc1c\uc744 \uc870\uc0ac
2) \ud53c\ud574\uc790\uc640 \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uac00 TTP \uc5c6\uc774 \uc554\ud638 \ud574\ub3c5 \ud0a4\ub97c \uc9c0\ubd88\ud558\uace0 \uacf5\uac1c\ud558\ub3c4\ub85d \uac15\uc81c\ud558\ub294 \uba54\ucee4\ub2c8\uc998 \uc81c\uc548<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Winning the Ransomware Lottery: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Preventing Ransoware Attacks<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Security \u00b7 Malware \u00b7 Economics \u00b7 Ransomware \u00b7 Incentives \u00b7 Backups<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ub79c\uc12c\uc6e8\uc5b4\ub294 \uc0ac\uc6a9\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ubb34\ud55c\ud55c \uc778\uc13c\ud2f0\ube0c\uac00 \uc788\uc74c
off-site backups\uc774 \ub79c\uc12c\uc6e8\uc5b4 \uacf5\uaca9\uc758 \uc601\ud5a5\uc744 \ub300\ube44\ud558\ub294\ub370 \ud6a8\uacfc\uc801<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Off-Site Backups: \uc2dc\uc2a4\ud15c\uc744 \ub79c\uc12c\uc6e8\uc5b4 \uc774\uc804 \uad6c\uc131\uc73c\ub85c \ubcf5\uc6d0\ud558\ub294\ub370 \uc0ac\uc6a9<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Combating Ransomware in Internet of Things: A Games-in-Games Approach for Cross-Layer Cyber Defense and Security Investment<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Abstract | dl.acm.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c \uc2dc\uc2a4\ud15c\uc744 \ubcf4\ud638\ud558\ub824\uba74 \uad50\ucc28 \uacc4\uce35 \uc704\ud5d8 \ubd84\uc11d\uc774 \ud544\uc694\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ub79c\uc12c\uc6e8\uc5b4\uc758 \ub2e4\ub2e8\uacc4 \uce68\ud22c\ub97c \ud3ec\ucc29\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 \uc81c\ub85c\uc12c Markov \uac8c\uc784 \uc0ac\uc6a9<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cyber-physical Systems Security<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Controlled Islanding in the Presence of Adversaries<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud1b5\uc81c\ub41c \ub2e8\ub3c5\ud6c8\ub828\uc740 \uc804\ub825 \uc2dc\uc2a4\ud15c\uc744 \uc11c\ub85c \ubd84\ub9ac\ub41c \uc5ec\ub7ec \uac1c\uc758 \uc12c\uc73c\ub85c \ubd84\ud560
islanding problem<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc774\uc911 \uc624\ub77c\ud074 \uc54c\uace0\ub9ac\uc998 \uc811\uadfc \ubc29\uc2dd\uc744 \uc81c\uc548
grid \uc6b4\uc601\uc790\uc640 \uc801\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uc751\ub2f5\uc774 \ud63c\ud569 \uc815\uc218 \uc120\ud615 \ud504\ub85c\uadf8\ub7a8\uc73c\ub85c \uacf5\uc2dd\ud654\ub420 \uc218 \uc788\uc74c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Stackelberg equilibrium\uc744 \uacf5\uc2dd\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 MINLP(mixed integer nonlinear program) \uacf5\uc2dd\ud654<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Game Theoretic Hardware Trojan Testing Under Cost Considerations<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
par.nsf.gov<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keyword: Game Theory \u00b7 Hardware Trojans \u00b7 Security<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud558\ub4dc\uc6e8\uc5b4 \ud2b8\ub85c\uc774 \ubaa9\ub9c8\uc758 \uc874\uc7ac \uc5ec\ubd80 \ud655\uc778\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c \uc9d1\uc801\ud68c\ub85c(IC) \ud14c\uc2a4\ud2b8<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Strategic Remote Attestation: Testbed for Internet-of-Things Devices and Stackelberg Security Game for Optimal Strategies<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Remote Attestation \u00b7 Stackelberg Security Game \u00b7 Internet of Things \u00b7 Security Testbed \u00b7 Software Security<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IoT \uc7a5\uce58\uc758 \uc6d0\uaca9 \uc99d\uba85\uc744 \uc704\ud55c \ud14c\uc2a4\ud2b8\ubca0\ub4dc \uac1c\ubc1c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1) IoT \uc560\ud50c\ub9ac\ucf00\uc774\uc158, \uba54\ubaa8\ub9ac \uccb4\ud06c\uc12c \uae30\ubc18 \uacf5\uaca9, \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uac00 \uc2e4\ud589 \uc911\uc778 \uc560\ud50c\ub9ac\ucf00\uc774\uc158\uc5d0 \uc784\uc758\uc758 \ucf54\ub4dc \uc0bd\uc785
2) Stackelberg \ubcf4\uc548 \uac8c\uc784\uc73c\ub85c \uc6d0\uaca9 \uc99d\uba85\uc744 \uc801\uc6a9\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c \ucd5c\uc801\uc758 \uc804\ub7b5 \ucc3e\ub294 \ubb38\uc81c\ub97c \ubaa8\ub378\ub9c1\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ubcf4\uc548 \uae30\ub2a5 \ud65c\uc131\ud654, \uc18c\ud504\ud2b8\uc6e8\uc5b4 \uae30\ubc18 \uc99d\uba85 \ubc29\ubc95(\uc21c\ucc28 \ubc0f \ub79c\ub364 \uba54\ubaa8\ub9ac \uae30\ubc18 \uccb4\ud06c\uc12c \uac80\uc99d)
\ud14c\uc2a4\ud2b8\ubca0\ub4dc\uc5d0 \ud3ec\ud568\ub41c \ub2e4\ub978 \ubcc0\ud615\ub41c \uc99d\uba85 \ubc29\ubc95(e.g., hybrid checksum) \ud3ec\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ub9ac\uc18c\uc2a4\uac00 \uc81c\ud55c\ub41c \ud658\uacbd\uc5d0\uc11c \uc6d0\uaca9 \uc99d\uba85\uc744 \ud1b5\ud574 IoT \uc7a5\uce58\ub97c \ubcf4\ud638\ud558\ub294 \ubc29\ubc95<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Innovations in Attacks and Defenses<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Bet and Attack: Incentive Compatible Collaborative Attacks Using Smart Contracts<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
ppt | ghadaalmashaqbeh.github.io<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Collaborative attacks \u00b7 Mechanism design \u00b7 Criminal smart contracts \u00b7 Blockchain model<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc2a4\ub9c8\ud2b8 \uacc4\uc57d \uae30\ubc18 \ube14\ub85d\uccb4\uc778 \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud558\uc5ec \ubd84\uc0b0\ud615 \uc560\ud50c\ub9ac\ucf00\uc774\uc158 \uad6c\ucd95, \uc774\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ub370\uc774\ud130 \ud53c\ub4dc\ub97c \uc81c\uacf5\ud558\ub294 Oracle \uc11c\ube44\uc2a4 \ub4f1\uc7a5
DDoS\ub97c \uc0ac\uc6a9 \uc0ac\ub840\ub85c \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uc758 \uc0c1\ud638 \uc791\uc6a9\uc744 \uac8c\uc784\uc73c\ub85c \uacf5\uc2dd\ud654<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc2a4\ub9c8\ud2b8 \uacc4\uc57d \uae30\ubc18 \ud504\ub808\uc784\uc6cc\ud06c \uc18c\uac1c – criminal smart contracts (CSCs)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Upon Deploying CSC by an Attack Sponsor S
Upon Submitting a Bet by an Attacker A<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Combating Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) Attacks: Modeling and Mitigation of Attentional Human Vulnerability<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Human vulnerability \u00b7 Alert fatigue \u00b7 Cyber feint attack \u00b7 Temporaldifference learning \u00b7 Risk Analysis \u00b7 Attention management \u00b7 Cognitive load<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc778\uac04\uc758 \uc8fc\uc758\ub825 \ucde8\uc57d\uc131\uc744 \uc545\uc6a9\ud558\ub294 Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) attacks \uc81c\uc548<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IDoS \uacf5\uaca9\uc758 \uc21c\ucc28\uc801 \ub3c4\ucc29\uc744 semi-Markov \ud504\ub85c\uc138\uc2a4\ub85c \ubaa8\ub378\ub9c1<\/p>\n\n\n
\n
\"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n
IDoS \uacf5\uaca9\uc758 \uc21c\ucc28\uc801 \ub3c4\ucc29\uc744 \uc138\ubbf8 \ub9c8\ub974\ucf54\ud504 \ud504\ub85c\uc138\uc2a4\ub85c \ubaa8\ub378\ub9c1
\uac80\uc0ac \uc2dc\uac04\uc744 \uc6b0\ub824\ud558\ub294 \uc99d\uac00\ud558\ub294 \ub2e8\uacc4 \uae30\ub2a5\uc73c\ub85c \uc62c\ubc14\ub978 \uc758\uc0ac \uacb0\uc815\uc758 \ud655\ub960\uc744 \ubaa8\ub378\ub9c1<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Password Strength Signaling: A Counter-Intuitive Defense Against Password Cracking<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Index Terms\u2014Bayesian Persuasion, Password Authentication, Stackelberg Game<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ube44\ubc00\ubc88\ud638 \ud06c\ub798\ud0b9 \uacf5\uaca9, \uc778\uc99d \uc11c\ubc84\uac00 \uc624\ud504\ub77c\uc778 \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uac00 \ucc3e\uc744 \uc218 \uc788\ub3c4\ub85d \uac01 \uc0ac\uc6a9\uc790 \ube44\ubc00\ubc88\ud638\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c noisy \uc2dc\uadf8\ub110\uc744 \uc800\uc7a5\ud558\ub3c4\ub85d \ud558\ub294 \uac83
\uc5ec\ub7ec \uc554\ud638 \ub370\uc774\ud130\uc14b\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uba54\ucee4\ub2c8\uc998 \ud3c9\uac00 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
cryptographic hash (salted)
CAPTCHA or proof of work(PoW)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uacbd\ud5d8\uc801 \ubc30\ud3ec \ubd84\ud3ec \ud14c\uc2a4\ud2b8\ub97c \ud560 \ub54c, (resp. Monte Carlo) \uc815\ubcf4 \uc2e0\ud638\ub97c \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud558\uba74 \ud06c\ub799\ub420 \uc218 \uc788\ub294 \ube44\ubc00\ubc88\ud638 \uc218\uac00 \uac10\uc18c\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Evaluating Attacker Risk Behavior in an Internet of Things Ecosystem<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
arxiv.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keywords: Game Theory \u00b7 Security \u00b7 Malware \u00b7 Internet of Things<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ub79c\uc12c\uc6e8\uc5b4\ub294 15\ucd08\ub9c8\ub2e4 \uba85\ub839 \ubc0f \uc81c\uc5b4 \uc11c\ubc84\uc640 \ud1b5\uc2e0\ud568
\ud0a4\ub85c\uac70\ub294 0.1\ucd08\ub9c8\ub2e4 2\uac1c\uc758 \ud0a4\ub97c \ucd94\ucd9c\ud568, \ud06c\ub9bd\ud1a0\ub9c8\uc774\ub108\ub294 0.1\ucd08\ub9c8\ub2e4 \uba85\ub839 \ubc0f \uc81c\uc5b4 \uc11c\ubc84\uc640 \ud1b5\uc2e0\ud568
\uc774 \uc694\uae08\uc740 \ubb34\uc81c\ud55c\uc758 \ubcc0\ud615\uc744 \ub9cc\ub4e4\uae30 \uc704\ud574 \uac01 \ud1b5\uc2e0 \uac04\uaca9\uc5d0\uc11c \ubcc0\uacbd\ub418\ub3c4\ub85d \uc704\uc544\ub798\ub85c \uc870\uc815\ud558\uac70\ub098 \uc218\uc815\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\uc74c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\uc545\uc131\ucf54\ub4dc \ub9e4\uac1c\ubcc0\uc218\ud654<\/p>\n\n\n
\n
\"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Paying Firms to Share Cyber Threat Intelligence<\/mark><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Abstract | dl.acm.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ucee4\ubba4\ub2c8\ud2f0\uc758 \uc0ac\uc774\ubc84 \ubcf4\uc548 \uc0c1\ud0dc\ub97c \uac1c\uc120
\uc911\uc559 \ub2f9\uad6d\uc774 \uacbd\uc7c1 \uae30\uc5c5 \uac04\uc758 \uc815\ubcf4 \uacf5\uc720\ub97c \ucd09\uc9c4\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 \uc5b4\ub5bb\uac8c \uae08\uc804\uc801 \uc778\uc13c\ud2f0\ube0c\ub97c \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\ub294\uc9c0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
References<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Decision and Game Theory for Security: 12th International Conference, GameSec 2021 Virtual Event, October 25-27, 2021 Proceedings<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Decision and Game Theory for Security: 12th International Conference, GameSec 2021 Virtual Event, October 25-27, 2021 Proceedings<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[138],"tags":[135,4,134,137,136],"class_list":["post-2778","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-conference","tag-conference","tag-game-theory","tag-gamesec","tag-oct-05-2023","tag-security"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2778"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2778"}],"version-history":[{"count":49,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2778\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2833,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2778\/revisions\/2833"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2778"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2778"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2778"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}