{"id":2564,"date":"2023-08-25T23:34:18","date_gmt":"2023-08-25T14:34:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/?p=2564"},"modified":"2023-08-26T00:13:05","modified_gmt":"2023-08-25T15:13:05","slug":"review-5-deceptive-routing-in-relay-networks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/2023\/08\/review-5-deceptive-routing-in-relay-networks\/","title":{"rendered":"[review #5] Deceptive routing in relay networks"},"content":{"rendered":"

Contents<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Andrew Clark, Quanyan Zhu, Radha Poovendran, and Tamer Ba\u015far. 2012. Deceptive routing in relay networks. In Decision and Game Theory for Security. Springer, 171\u2013185.\n\n1. Introduction\n2. Related Work\n3. Model and Preliminaries\n4. Game Formulation and Equilibria\n5. Simulation Results\n6. Conclusion\n7. References<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
Keywords – Game Theory, Stackelberg Equilibrium, Routing Algorithms, Jamming and Security, Relay Networks<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ubc29\ud574 \uacf5\uaca9(jamming attacks)\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ubb3c\ub9ac\uc801 \uacc4\uce35\uacfc MAC \uacc4\uce35 \ubc29\uc5b4 \uba54\ucee4\ub2c8\uc998\uc740, \uc885\uc885 \uacf5\uaca9 \ud6c4\uc758 \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9 delay\uc640 loss\uc5d0 \ubcf8\uc9c8\uc801\uc73c\ub85c \ubc18\uc751\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
section 1: \uc18c\uac1c
section 2: \ubc29\ud574 \uacf5\uaca9\uacfc \ubc29\uc5b4\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uad00\ub828 \uc791\uc5c5 \uac80\ud1a0
section 3: \uc2dc\uc2a4\ud15c\uacfc \uc801 \ubaa8\ub378 \uc18c\uac1c
section 4: \uac01 \ud50c\ub808\uc774\uc5b4\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uac8c\uc784 \uacf5\uc2dd\ud654 \ubc0f \uc194\ub8e8\uc158 \uc54c\uace0\ub9ac\uc998
section 5: \uc2dc\ubbac\ub808\uc774\uc158 \uacb0\uacfc \uc81c\uc2dc
section 6: \ub17c\ubb38 \ub9c8\ubb34\ub9ac<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. Introduction<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\ubb34\uc120 \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c\ub294 \ub9ce\uc740 \uad70\uc0ac \ubc0f \uc0c1\uc5c5 \uc560\ud50c\ub9ac\ucf00\uc774\uc158\uc5d0\uc11c \uc911\uc694\ud55c \uc5ed\ud560\uc744 \ud55c\ub2e4.
\uadf8\ub7ec\ub098 \uac1c\ubc29\ud615 \ubb34\uc120 \ub9e4\uccb4\ub294 \uadf8\ub7ec\ud55c \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c\ub97c \uc801\ub4e4\uc774 \ub178\ub4dc \uadfc\ucc98\uc5d0\uc11c \uac04\uc12d \uc2e0\ud638\ub97c \ubc29\uc1a1\ud558\uc5ec \ub4e4\uc5b4\uc624\ub294 \ud328\ud0b7\uc774 \uc62c\ubc14\ub974\uac8c \ub514\ucf54\ub529\ub418\ub294 \uac83\uc744 \ubc29\uc9c0\ud558\ub294 \ubc29\ud574 \uacf5\uaca9(jamming attacks)\uc5d0 \ucde8\uc57d\ud558\uac8c \ub9cc\ub4e0\ub2e4.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Jamming attacks\uac00 \ud2b9\ud788 \ud574\ub85c\uc6b4 \uacbd\uc6b0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  • \uc801\uc774 \ub178\ub4dc\uc5d0\uc11c \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud558\ub294 physical \ub610\ub294 MAC layer \ud504\ub85c\ud1a0\ucf5c\uc758 \uc57d\uc810\uc744 \uc545\uc6a9(exploit)\ud560 \ub54c<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • \uba40\ud2f0 \ud649 \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c\uc758 \uc911\uac04 relay nodes\ub97c \ub300\uc0c1\uc73c\ub85c end-to-end-throughput(\ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9)\uc744 \uc904\uc77c \ub54c<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
    jamming\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c defense mechanisms<\/p>\n\n\n\n
      \n
    • based on \ubb3c\ub9ac\uc801 \uacc4\uce35 \uae30\uc220<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    • beamforming, \ud655\uc0b0 \uc2a4\ud399\ud2b8\ub7fc, \uc9c0\ud5a5\uc131 \uc548\ud14c\ub098, \ucc44\ub110 \uc11c\ud551\uacfc \uac19\uc740 MAC \uacc4\uce35 \ud504\ub85c\ud1a0\ucf5c \ub4f1<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
      \uba40\ud2f0 \ud649 \ub77c\uc6b0\ud305\uc774 \uc0ac\uc6a9\ub420 \ub54c, source nodes\ub294 jamming\uc73c\ub85c \uc778\ud574<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \n
      • \ub192\uc740 \ud328\ud0b7 \uc190\uc2e4\uc774 \ubc1c\uc0dd\ud558\ub294 \uacbd\ub85c\uc758 \uc720\ub7c9(flow rate)\uc744 \uc904\uc77c \uc218 \uc788\uc74c<\/li>\n\n\n\n
      • \ub0ae\uc740 \ud328\ud0b7 \uc190\uc2e4\uc774 \ubc1c\uc0dd\ud558\ub294 \uacbd\ub85c\uc758 \uc18d\ub3c4(rate)\ub97c \uc99d\uac00\uc2dc\ud0ac \uc218 \uc788\uc74c<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
        When multi-hop routing is used, the source nodes can also decrease the flow rate on paths that experience high packet-loss due to jamming, while increasing the rate on routes experiencing lower packet-loss [10].<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        2. Related Work<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
        \ubd84\ub958<\/td>\uc0c1\uc138<\/td><\/tr>
        \ubaa9\ud45c<\/td>\uba40\ud2f0 \ud649 \ubb34\uc120 \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c\uc758 \ubc29\ud574\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uc0ac\uc804 \uc608\ubc29\uc801 \ubc29\uc5b4 \uba54\ucee4\ub2c8\uc998 \uc5f0\uad6c
        – \ubd84\ub9ac\ub41c \ub77c\uc6b0\ud305 \uacbd\ub85c\ub97c \ub530\ub77c\uc11c \ubb34\uc791\uc704\ub85c \ub354\ubbf8 \ud328\ud0b7\uc774 \uc0dd\uc131\ub428
        – \uc774 \ud328\ud0b7\uc73c\ub85c \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c \ud750\ub984\uc744 \uad6c\uc131\ud558\uc5ec \ubc29\ud574\ud568
        In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming for multi-hop wireless networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow, consisting of randomly generated dummy packets, along a disjoint routing path.<\/td><\/tr>
        \uc81c\uc57d\uc0ac\ud56d<\/td>1) deceptive packets\uc740 real packets\uacfc \ub3d9\uc77c\ud55c \ub9c1\ud06c\ub97c \ud1b5\uacfc\ud558\uc5ec \ud63c\uc7a1(congestion)\uacfc \uc9c0\uc5f0(delay)\uc744 \uc99d\uac00\uc2dc\ud0ac \uac83
        2) \uac01 source node\ub294 \ud328\ud0b7 \uc0dd\uc131, \uc554\ud638\ud654, \uc804\uc1a1\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\ub294 \uc6a9\ub7c9\uc774 \uc81c\ud55c\uc801
        – \uc774 \ubd80\uc871\ud55c \uc6a9\ub7c9\uc740 real\/fake \ud750\ub984\uc73c\ub85c \ub098\ub204\uc5b4\uc57c \ud568
        3) fake packets\uc774 \uc801\uc758 \ub2a5\ub825\uacfc \ubaa9\ud45c\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uc815\ubcf4\ub97c \ud65c\uc6a9\ud558\ub294 \ucd5c\uc801\uc758 \uc804\ub7b5\uc5d0 \ub530\ub77c \ub3c4\uc785\ub418\uc9c0 \uc54a\ub294\ub2e4\uba74,
        \uc18d\uc784\uc218\ub294 real nodes\uc758 \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9\uc744 \ub192\uc774\ub294 \ub370\uc5d0 \ud6a8\uacfc\uac00 \uc5c6\uc744 \uc218 \uc788\uc74c
        + \ud63c\uc7a1 \uc99d\uac00\ub85c \ube44\uc0dd\uc0b0\uc801\uc77c \uc218 \uc788\uc74c<\/td><\/tr>
        \uac8c\uc784\ubaa8\ub378<\/td>Stackelberg equilibrium\uc5d0\uc11c \uc18d\uc784\uc218 \uc804\ub7b5\uc744 \uc5bb\uae30 \uc704\ud574 2\ub2e8\uacc4 \uac8c\uc784 \ubaa8\ub378\uc744 \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud568<\/td><\/tr>
        \uac8c\uc784\ub2e8\uacc4<\/td>\uc18c\uc2a4\uc640 \uc7ac\ubc0d \uacf5\uaca9\uc744 \uac00\ud558\ub294 \uc801 \uc0ac\uc774\uc758 2\ub2e8\uacc4 \uac8c\uc784 \uae30\ubc18\uc73c\ub85c \ud504\ub808\uc784\uc6cc\ud06c \uc124\uc815
        1) \uc18c\uc2a4\ub294 real\/deceptive flow \ud560\ub2f9\uc744 \uc120\ud0dd\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 noncooperative game \uc218\ud589
        2) \uc801\uc740 \uac01 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 total flow \ud560\ub2f9\uc744 \uad00\ucc30, \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9 \uac10\uc18c\ub97c \uadf9\ub300\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 \uadf8\uc5d0 \ub530\ub77c jamming strategy \uc120\ud0dd<\/td><\/tr>
        \uc5f0\uad6c\ubc29\ubc95<\/td>two types of source behavior
        1) selfish source: \ub2e4\ub978 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc5d0 \uc758\ud574 \uc2e4\ud589\ub41c \uc9c0\uc5f0\uc744 \ubb34\uc2dc \u2192 own throughput\uc744 \uadf9\ub300\ud654
        2) altruistic source: \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \uc720\ub7c9\uc744 \uc120\ud0dd\ud560 \ub54c \ub2e4\ub978 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \uc9c0\uc5f0\uc744 \uace0\ub824
        \uac01 \uacbd\uc6b0\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uac8c\uc784 \ud3c9\ud615\uc744 \ub3c4\ucd9c
        \ud3c9\ud615\uc744 \uae30\ubc18\uc73c\ub85c \uac01 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc5d0\uc11c real\/deceptive flows\ub97c \ud560\ub2f9\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c \ud6a8\uc728\uc801\uc778 \uc54c\uace0\ub9ac\uc998 \uc81c\uacf5
        (through a simulation study)<\/td><\/tr>
        \uc911\uc810\uc0ac\ud56d<\/td>\ubc29\ud574\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ubc18\uc751\uc774 \uc544\ub2cc, given set of network flows\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ubc29\ud574\uc758 \uc601\ud5a5\uc744 \uc815\ub7c9\ud654\ud558\ub294\ub370 \ucd08\uc810<\/td><\/tr>
        \uacb0\uacfc<\/td>\uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ub3c4\uc785\ud558\uc5ec \ubc29\ud574 \uacf5\uaca9\uc744 \uc800\uc9c0 \u2192 \uc801\uc5d0\uac8c \uc790\uc6d0 \ub0ad\ube44 \u2192 \uc720\ud6a8\ud55c \ud328\ud0b7\uc774 \ub9c9\ud788\uc9c0 \uc54a\ub3c4\ub85d \ud568
        1) added deceptive flows: \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c \ud63c\uc7a1\uacfc \uc9c0\uc5f0\uc744 \uc99d\uac00\uc2dc\ud0ac \uc218 \uc788\uc74c
        2) effect of the deceptive flow: \ub2e4\ub978 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \ud750\ub984 \ud560\ub2f9\uc5d0 \ub530\ub77c \ub2ec\ub77c\uc9d0, \uc18c\uc2a4 \uac04\uc758 \uacb0\ud569\uc744 \ucd08\ub798\ud568
        – \uc801\uc5d0 \uc758\ud574 \ub9c9\ud78c \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ub3c4\uc785 \u2192 \uc801: \uadf8 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ubaa9\ud45c\ub85c \uc0bc\ub294 \uc790\uc6d0\uc774 \ubd80\uc871\ud568 \u2192 \uc18c\uc2a4\ub294 \uc790\uc2e0\uc758 \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9\uc744 \ud560\ub2f9, \uc778\uadfc \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9\ub3c4 \uac1c\uc120<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
        3. Model and Preliminaries<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n
        \n
        \"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n
        Fig.1. Illustration of the network model with two source nodes \\(s_1\\) and \\(s_2\\), which transmit data to destination \\(t_1\\) and \\(t_2\\), respectively, via the relay network consisting of five relay nodes \\(r_1, r_2, \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 , r_5\\).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        4. Game Formulation and Equilibria<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
        \uc801\uacfc \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c \uc18c\uc2a4 \uac04\uc758 \uc0c1\ud638\uc791\uc6a9
        1) \uc720\uc18d\uacfc \ub77c\uc6b0\ud305 \ud1a0\ud3f4\ub85c\uc9c0 \uad00\ucc30
        2) \ubc29\ud574 \uc804\ub7b5\uc744 \uc120\ud0dd\ud558\ub294 \uc801\uc758 \ud589\ub3d9 \uc124\uba85
        3) \uc720\ub7c9 \\(x_f\\)\uc744 \uacb0\uc815\ud558\ub294 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \ud589\ub3d9\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ub17c\uc758<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        4.1 Game Formulation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
        deceptive jamming game\uc740 \ub450 \ub2e8\uacc4\ub85c \uad6c\uc131\ub418\uc5b4 \uc788\uc74c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \uccab \ubc88\uc9f8 \ub2e8\uacc4\uc5d0\uc11c, \uac01 \uc18c\uc2a4 \\(s_i\\)\ub294 \uc2e4\uc81c \ubc0f \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ud750\ub984 \\(x_i^R\\)\uacfc \\(x_i^D\\)\ub97c \ub3d9\uc2dc\uc5d0 \uc120\ud0dd\ud568
        \ub450 \ubc88\uc9f8 \ub2e8\uacc4\uc5d0\uc11c, \uc801\ub4e4\uc740 \ubaa8\ub4e0 \\(f \\in \\mathrm{F}\\)\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uc720\ub7c9 \\(x_f\\)\uc744 \uad00\ucc30\ud558\uace0 \ubc29\ud574 \uc18d\ub3c4 \\(p_f\\) \uc120\ud0dd
        f\uac00 \uc18c\uc2a4 \\(s_i\\)\uc758 \uc2e4\uc81c \ud750\ub984\uc77c \ub54c \\(p_f\\) \u2254 \\(p_i^R\\)\uc744 \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud558\uba70,
        \\(p_i^D\\)\ub294 \uc18c\uc2a4 \\(s_i\\)\uc640\uc758 \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ubc29\ud574\ud560 \ud655\ub960
        \uc801\uc758 \ubaa9\ud45c\ub294 \ucd5c\uc801\ud654 \ubb38\uc81c\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ud574\uacb0\ucc45\uc778 \ucd5c\uc801\ud654 \ubc29\uc5b4 \uc804\ub7b5 \\(p_f^{*}, f \\in \\mathrm{F}_A\\)\uc744 \ucc3e\ub294 \uac83<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \\(\\displaystyle maximize_{p_f, f \\in F_A} \\sum_{f \\in F_A}U_A(p_f, x_f)\\)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \\(s.t. \\sum_{f \\in F_A} c_f p_f \\leq J\\)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \uc0c1\uc218 J: \uc801\uc758 \ucd1d \uc804\ub825 \uc608\uc0b0, Section 4.3\uc5d0\uc11c \ubd84\uc11d\uc744 \uc704\ud574 \\(U_A(p_f, x_f) = p_f x_f\\)\uc744 \uc120\ud0dd\ud568
        \uac01 \uc18c\uc2a4 \\(s_i\\)\uc5d0\uc11c \ubaa9\ud45c\ub294 \uc720\ud2f8\ub9ac\ud2f0 \ud568\uc218 \\(U_i(x_i^R, x_i^D, x_{-i})\\)\ub97c \ucd5c\uc801\ud654 (\\(x_{-i}\\): \ub2e4\ub978 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \uc720\uc18d)
        \u2192 \uc2e4\uc81c \ud328\ud0b7\uc758 \uc9c0\uc5f0\uc744 \uc81c\ud55c\ud558\uba74\uc11c \uc790\uccb4 \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9\uc744 \uadf9\ub300\ud654\ud558\uc5ec \uc720\ud2f8\ub9ac\ud2f0 \uae30\ub2a5\uc73c\ub85c \uc774\uc5b4\uc9d0<\/p>\n\n\n
        \n
        \"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n
        Fig. 2. Illustration of two-stage games and Stackelberg equilibrium is used as solution concept (a) Selfish source nodes: each source first decides on deceptive and real flows in a noncooperative way. (b) Cooperative source nodes: source nodes jointly optimize their data rates to achieve the best total utility. The attacker A sniffs the traffic of the network after source nodes decide on their data rates, and launches a jamming attack by choosing the power levels to affect the flows within its range of influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        (a) Selfish source nodes: \ube44\ud611\uc870\uc801\uc778 \ubc29\uc2dd\uc73c\ub85c deceptive and real flows\uc744 \uacb0\uc815
        (b) Cooperative source nodes: \uc18c\uc2a4 \ub178\ub4dc\ub294 best total utility\ub97c \ub2ec\uc131\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574, \ub370\uc774\ud130 \uc18d\ub3c4\ub97c \uacf5\ub3d9\uc73c\ub85c \ucd5c\uc801\ud654\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \uacf5\uaca9\uc790 A\ub294 \uc18c\uc2a4 \ub178\ub4dc\uac00 \ub370\uc774\ud130 \uc18d\ub3c4\ub97c \uacb0\uc815\ud55c \ud6c4, \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c \ud2b8\ub798\ud53d\uc744 sniffing\ud558\uc5ec, \uc601\ud5a5 \ubc94\uc704 \ub0b4 \ud750\ub984\uc5d0 \uc601\ud5a5\uc744 \ubbf8\uce60 \ub808\ubca8\uc744 \uc120\ud0dd\ud558\uc5ec \ubc29\ud574 \uacf5\uaca9\uc744 \uc2dc\uc791\ud568<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \ubcc4\ub3c4\uc758 \uacbd\ub85c\uc5d0 \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ub3c4\uc785\ud558\uba74,
        \ub2ec\uc131\ub41c \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9\u2191, \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \uc624\ub958\uc728\u2193, \ud63c\uc7a1\u2191, \ub098\uba38\uc9c0 \uc18c\uc2a4\uac00 \uacbd\ud5d8\ud558\ub294 \uc9c0\uc5f0\u2191<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        4.2 Equilibrium Concepts<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
        Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \uac8c\uc784\uc758 \ud3c9\ud615 \uac1c\ub150\uc740 \uac01 \ud50c\ub808\uc774\uc5b4\uac00 \uc0ac\uc6a9\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\ub294 \uc815\ubcf4\uc758 \uc591\uc5d0 \ub2ec\ub824 \uc788\ub2e4.
        \uc18c\uc2a4\uc640 \uc801 \uc0ac\uc774\uc758 \uac8c\uc784\uc744 \uc704\ud574, \uc801\ub4e4\uc740 \uc7ac\ubc0d \uc804\ub7b5 \\(p_1^R, p_1^D, … ,\\)\uc744 \uc120\ud0dd\ud558\uae30 \uc804 \uc18c\uc2a4 \uc18d\ub3c4 \\(x_1^R, x_1^D, … ,\\) \uc758 \uc18c\uc2a4 \ud589\ub3d9\uc744 \uad00\ucc30
        \ub530\ub77c\uc11c \uc0c1\ub300\ubc29\uc740 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \ud589\ub3d9\uc744 \uad00\ucc30\ud55c \ud6c4 \ucd5c\uc801\ud654 \ubb38\uc81c (3)\uc5d0 \ub530\ub77c \uc7ac\ubc0d \uc804\ub7b5 \\(p_f^{*}\\)\ub97c \uc120\ud0dd\ud560 \uac83<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        5. Simulation Results<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
        Matlab \uc2dc\ubbac\ub808\uc774\uc158 \uc5f0\uad6c\ub97c \ud1b5\ud574 \uc81c\uc548\ub41c \uc811\uadfc \ubc29\uc2dd\uc744 \uc124\uba85
        \ub124 \uac1c\uc758 \uc18c\uc2a4, \ub124 \uac1c\uc758 \ub9b4\ub808\uc774, \uadf8\ub9ac\uace0 \ud558\ub098\uc758 \ubaa9\uc801\uc9c0\uac00 \uc788\ub294 \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c\ub97c \uace0\ub824\ud55c\ub2e4.(\uac01 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \uc6a9\ub7c9\uc740 1)
        \ubaa8\ub4e0 \ub124\ud2b8\uc6cc\ud06c \ub9c1\ud06c\ub294 \ub3d9\ub4f1\ud55c \uc6a9\ub7c9\uc744 \uac00\uc9c0\uace0 \uc788\ub2e4.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        6. Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
        \uc18d\uc784\uc218\ub97c \ud1b5\ud574 \uacf5\uaca9\uc744 \uc644\ud654\ud558\ub294 \ubb38\uc81c \uc5f0\uad6c
        \uac01 \uc18c\uc2a4\uac00 \uc798\ubabb\ub41c \ud2b8\ub798\ud53d \ud750\ub984\uc744 \uc0dd\uc131 \u2192 \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uac00 \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ubaa9\ud45c\ub85c \ud558\ub294 \uc790\uc6d0\uc744 \uc18c\ube44 \u2192 \uc2e4\uc81c \ud328\ud0b7\uc774 \ubc29\ud574\ub97c \ud53c\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\ub3c4\ub85d \ud558\ub294 \ubc29\uc5b4 \uba54\ucee4\ub2c8\uc998\uc744 \uace0\ub824<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        source\uc640 jammer \uc0ac\uc774\uc758 two-stage game\uc73c\ub85c deceptive jamming\uc744 formulated\ud568
        1) source\ub294 \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9(throughput)\uc744 \ucd5c\ub300\ud654\ud558\uace0 \uc9c0\uc5f0(delay)\uc744 \ucd5c\uc18c\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 real and deceptive flow\ub97c \ub3d9\uc2dc\uc5d0 \uc120\ud0dd
        2) \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\ub294 real and deceptive flow\ub97c \uad00\ucc30\ud558\uace0 \uac01 \ud750\ub984\uc758 \ubd84\uc218\ub85c \ub300\ud45c\ub418\ub294 jamming strategy \uc120\ud0dd<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \uacf5\uaca9\uc790\uc758 \ucd5c\uc801 \uc804\ub7b5\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c closed-form expression\uc744 \ub3c4\ucd9c
        : \uae30\ub9cc\uc801\uc778 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ud45c\uc801\uc73c\ub85c \uc0bc\ub294 \ub370 \uc0ac\uc6a9\ub420 \uc801\uc758 \ubc29\ud574 \uc790\uc6d0 \ubd80\ubd84, \uc18d\uc784\uc218 \uc0ac\uc6a9\uc73c\ub85c \uc778\ud55c \uc2e4\uc81c \ud750\ub984\uc758 \ucd94\uac00 \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        For the sources, \ub450 \uac00\uc9c0 \uacbd\uc6b0\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c pure-strategy Stackelberg equilibria\uc758 \uc874\uc7ac\ub97c \uc99d\uba85\ud568
        \u2460 \uac01 source\uac00 \uc790\uccb4 \uc720\ud2f8\ub9ac\ud2f0 (selfish users)\ub97c \ucd5c\ub300\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 \ud750\ub984\uc744 \ud560\ub2f9\ud558\ub294 \uacbd\uc6b0
        \u2461 \uac01 \uc18c\uc2a4\uac00 \uc720\uc18d (altruistic users)\uc744 \uc120\ud0dd\ud560 \ub54c \ub2e4\ub978 \uc18c\uc2a4\uc758 \ud63c\uc7a1\uc744 \ud1b5\ud569\ud558\ub294 \uacbd\uc6b0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \ub450 \uacbd\uc6b0 \ubaa8\ub450\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \ud3c9\ud615\uc744 \uacc4\uc0b0\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c \uc54c\uace0\ub9ac\uc998 \uc81c\uc548
        \ucc98\ub9ac\ub7c9\uc744 \uadf9\ub300\ud654\ud558\uace0 \uc9c0\uc5f0\uc744 \ucd5c\uc18c\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud574 \uac01 source\uc5d0\uc11c real and deceptive flows\uc744 \ud560\ub2f9\ud558\ub294 \ud6a8\uc728\uc801\uc778 \ubc29\ubc95 \uc81c\uc548<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        \uc2dc\ubbac\ub808\uc774\uc158 \uc5f0\uad6c\ub97c \ud1b5\ud55c \uc811\uadfc \ubc29\uc2dd \uacb0\uacfc: \uc774\ud0c0\uc801\uc778 \ud589\ub3d9(altruistic behavior)\uc774 \ucd9c\ucc98\uc758 \uc804\ubc18\uc801\uc778 \uc720\uc6a9\uc131\uc744 \ud5a5\uc0c1\uc2dc\ud0b4
        \ud5a5\ud6c4 \uc791\uc5c5\uc5d0\uc11c, selfish source behavior\uc73c\ub85c \uc778\ud55c \ud6a8\uc728\uc131\uc758 \uc190\uc2e4\uc744 \ubd84\uc11d\ud558\uace0, \uc18d\uc784\uc218\uc758 \uac00\uce58\ub97c \uc815\ub7c9\ud654\ud558\uae30 \uc704\ud55c \uc9c0\ud45c \uac1c\ubc1c
        \ucd9c\ucc98\uac00 \uc801\uc758 \uc720\ud2f8\ub9ac\ud2f0 \uae30\ub2a5\uacfc \ube44\uc6a9\uc5d0 \uad00\ud55c \ubd88\uc644\uc804\ud55c \uc815\ubcf4\ub97c \uac00\uc9c0\uace0 \uc788\ub294 \uacbd\uc6b0\ub97c \uc5f0\uad6c\ud560 \uac83<\/p>\n\n\n\n
        <\/p>\n\n\n\n
        7. References<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
          \n
        • Andrew Clark, Quanyan Zhu, Radha Poovendran, and Tamer Ba\u015far. 2012. Deceptive routing in relay networks. In Decision and Game Theory for Security. Springer, 171\u2013185.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
          <\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
          In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[108],"tags":[124,4,125],"class_list":["post-2564","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-paper-review","tag-deceptive-routing","tag-game-theory","tag-network"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2564"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2564"}],"version-history":[{"count":35,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2564\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2613,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2564\/revisions\/2613"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2564"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2564"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/saraheee.com\/ko\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2564"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}